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Abstract
The increase in health-care expenditures is a major problem of
all welfare states. To counter this trend, since the early 1980s most
OECD countries have changed the way hospitals are financed. While
these reforms are certainly linked to country-specific factors, our main
argument is that they are in part due to a diffusion process: policy
change in one country is influenced by previous changes in other coun-
tries. More specifically, we argue that policymakers learn from the
experience of others. We rely on an original data set and use event-
history methods to test our arguments. Our results show that policy
change is more likely when the existing policy is ineffective and when
the experience of other countries suggests that the reform leads to the
desired results. In addition, we find that the effects of learning grow
over time, and that early adopters tend to be countries with few veto
players.
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1 Introduction
This article argues that countries influence each other in the development of
social policies, which, as a result, diffuse internationally.
Few scholars believe that national social policies are independent of each
other. However, this assumption is implicit in most studies, even though Col-
lier and Messick (1975, 1272) contended more than 30 years ago that welfare
states have developed interdependently, and despite the important literature
on the diffusion of welfare policies in US states (for example, Berry, Fording,
and Hanson 2003; Berry and Baybeck 2005; Volden 2006). Some authors
have recently started to take this claim seriously (for example, Swank 2006;
Jahn 2006; Brooks 2005; Brooks 2007; Franzese and Hays 2006), but these
works are exceptions, and the literature is still predominantly concentrated
on the issues of retrenchment, the role of globalization, and the old vs. new
politics of the welfare state (for example, Pierson 2001b; Korpi and Palme
2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004; Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005).
The main goal of this article is to demonstrate that diffusion is an important
driver of welfare state reform and should therefore occupy a more prominent
place in the research agenda of the field.
While our theoretical arguments are general and can be applied to a
wide range of social policies, we focus empirically on the health care sector,
which the literature has often neglected in favor of pension and labor market
policies (Hacker 2004a, 693). More specifically, we study whether and how
hospital financing reforms in OECD countries have been characterized by a
diffusion process. According to Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006, 787),
“[i]nternational policy diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in a
given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in
other countries”1. In particular, we argue that the spread of hospital financ-
ing reforms has been partly driven by learning, defined as a process whereby
policy-makers use the experience of other countries to update their beliefs on
the consequences of a policy (Meseguer 2004; Meseguer 2006b). Our depen-
dent variable is the decision to introduce prospective-payment methods based
on patient-classification systems, whereby hospitals receive a lump sum ac-
cording to the type of pathology treated. Our study, therefore, distinguishes
itself from most of the welfare state literature and many diffusion studies by
not looking at aggregate figures such as spending, but rather at the decisions
that lead to those figures.
Our main result is that the adoption of hospital financing reforms is
1For similar definitions, see Simmons and Elkins (2004), Meseguer (2004), Braun and
Gilardi (2006).
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influenced by their consequences in other countries. Policy change is more
likely when the experience of others shows that patient-classification systems
lead to better control of public expenditures on health. In other words, these
policies have diffused in a learning process. Furthermore, contrary to our
expectations we find that learning has become more important over time:
the experience of others becomes more influential as the diffusion process
unfolds. Other findings are that the adoption of hospital financing reforms
is more likely when the existing policy is not effective, and that innovators
tend to be countries where the institutional context favors policy change. The
specificity of the reform that we study means that some of these findings do
not necessarily transfer to other welfare policies. In particular, we expect
domestic factors to play a more prominent role, both independently and as
filters of diffusions, in areas that are highly politicized, such as labor market
policies or pensions reform.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces hospital financ-
ing reforms and shows that they have spread across OECD countries. Section
3 presents theory and hypotheses, Section 4 discusses data and methods, and
Section 5 reports the results of the statistical analysis and discusses their ro-
bustness. In the conclusion we elaborate on the implications of our findings
for research on the welfare state and on diffusion.
2 Hospital financing reforms in OECD coun-
tries: the spread of patient-classification
systems
Since the early 1980s, health care expenditures have risen much faster than
GDP. While in 1980 total expenditure on health represented 7.1% of GDP
on average in core OECD countries, in 2000 this share had reached 9%, and
in some countries, such as Switzerland, Germany, and the United States, had
even passed the 10% threshold (OECD 2006). Similarly, public expenditure
on health increased from 5.3% of GDP to 6.3% in the same period. This
“context of permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001a) has exerted considerable
pressures on public and private budgets, and has made cost containment
in the health sector a priority for most governments. We focus here on
reforms of hospital financing. While hospitals are only one part of the health
care system, inpatient expenditures constitute a significant share of health
expenditures. In 2000, on average they accounted for more than 44% of
public expenditures and more than 35% of total expenditures on health in
OECD countries (OECD 2006).
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One of the major reforms in the hospital sector is the change from a ret-
rospective to a prospective payment system. Whereas under a retrospective
system providers are reimbursed after the delivery of services, for example on
the basis of the number of hospital beds and average length of stay of patients,
a prospective system determines payments before services are delivered. Pa-
tients are classified according to their pathology, and hospitals receive a pre-
determined payment for each patient according to his or her “type”. For this
reason, this kind of financing is called a “patient-classification system”. Clas-
sifying patients in specific groups makes it possible to analyze and compare
the medical treatments of different patients and their resource consumption.
The introduction of patient-classification systems has two main objec-
tives. The first relates to management: patient-classification systems create
incentives for hospitals to increase efficiency, control costs and reduce the
length of stay of patients. Since they receive a fixed sum for each type
of patient, hospitals have incentives to find the most efficient way to treat
them. The second purpose of patient-classification systems is to increase the
transparency of hospitals’ activity. The goal here is to allow third-party pay-
ers to compare in a systematic way the performance of hospitals on various
dimensions such as quality and costs. Indirectly, this second use of patient-
classification systems can be expected to increase the efficiency of hospitals
through yardstick competition and benchmarking.
“Patient-classification system”, however, is a generic term. Several types
have been developed since the first tests in the United States during the
1970s, including Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), Disease Staging (DS) and
Patient Management Category (PMC). In practice, DRGs are the patient-
classification system that has been most widely employed. In contrast to
other patient-classification systems, the assignment to a DRG is based pri-
marily on the main diagnosis of a patient as well as on the presence or absence
of a surgical intervention.
The development of DRGs began in the late 1960s at Yale. Their first
application on a large scale dates back to 1983, when the Centre for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS) at the Department of Health and Human
Services adopted DRGs as a Medicare prospective-payment system2. With
the implementation in the Medicare program, the CMS became the owner of
the current DRGs definitions and therefore also became responsible for their
maintenance and modification. Under contract with the CMS, the company
3M Health Information Systems has performed all revisions of the DRGs
definitions and related software and documentation. Whereas the original
2This first version of DRG is called HCFA-DRG, referring to the Health Care Finance
Administration that first established it.
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definitions developed at Yale encompassed all types of patients in acute care
hospitals, the modification and further development of DRGs definitions used
within Medicare concentrated, quite naturally, on problems relating to the
elderly. This became an important limitation of applications of the DRGs sys-
tem outside the Medicare program, that is, for parts of the population other
than the elderly. To address these problems, several variations of DRGs have
been developed, such as the Refined-DRG, the All-Patient DRG (AP-DRG)
or the All-Patient Refined DRG (APR-DRG).
Since their introduction in the Medicare program, DRGs have been ap-
plied in different domains. Hospitals have used them as the basis of in-
ternal management systems, Medicaid programs and Blue Cross plans for
the payment system, and State data commission for state-wide compara-
tive reporting. DRGs were not only used in the US health care system,
but spread to Canada, Australia/New Zealand, Europe and Asia. Since the
early 1980s, several European countries have tested the original DRG ver-
sion (HCFA-DRG) either for pure research or for management or resource
allocation purposes. Most early projects were conducted with the method-
ological support of either Yales Health Services Management Group (led by
Professor Robert Fetter) or the company 3M Health Information Systems,
from which some countries eventually bought classification systems such as
the All-Patient DRG or the International Refined DRG. Several major ver-
sions of DRGs are currently used. They differ in the way they define groups,
the number of groups they distinguish, and the type of patient they take
into account. Some countries (for example Spain, Portugal, and Italy) have
adopted an existing version of DRG. Other countries have adapted an exist-
ing DRG system to their specific needs. Cases in point are Nordic countries,
which together developed the NordDRGs system, and its country-specific
variations, namely, France (GHM, EfP), and Australia (AN/AR DRG). The
Australian system was then imported to Germany and adapted to the charac-
teristics of that country (G-DRG). In turn, the German system will from 2008
be implemented, with adaptations, in Switzerland (Swiss-DRG). Finally, in
some countries existing DRG systems have been tested but discarded, and
country-specific DRGs have been developed instead. This has been the case
in Austria (LDF system), Canada (CMG), Netherlands (DBC) and the UK
(HRG).
The introduction of DRGs into a particular hospital system is complex
and resource-intensive, as the chosen DRG definitions must fit the national
hospital database and be adapted to culturally-specific medical treatments.
In addition, the use of DRGs for resource allocation implies the development
and regular update of grouper software, cost weights and information sys-
tems. The introduction of a common hospital reform at the national level is
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Figure 1: The spread of patient-classification systems in 19 OECD countries.
made even more complicated by the facts that many health care systems are
characterized by a high degree of decentralization and that hospital financ-
ing is often organized at the local level, at least in part. Nevertheless, DRGs
have spread internationally, as shown in Figure 1.
3 Theory and hypotheses
How can the spread of hospital financing reforms shown in Figure 1 be ex-
plained? Our arguments are based on a theoretical model of policy change
and diffusion put forward by Braun and Gilardi (2006)(see also Braun, Gi-
lardi, Fu¨glister, and Luyet 2007). The basic idea is that policy change occurs
if its expected utility is greater than that of the status quo. The expected
utility, in turn, depends on two factors: payoffs and effectiveness. First, some
policies are more attractive than others, either in terms of policy preferences
(for example, policy-makers may prefer private provision of health care on
ideological grounds) or in terms of electoral rewards (policy-makers may re-
frain from reforming the health care system because they fear electoral sanc-
tions). Second, some policies are more effective than others in achieving their
objectives. For example, broad structural trends such as population ageing,
the transformation of household structures, and post-industrialization have
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made existing welfare state arrangements less and less sustainable (Pierson
2001c). Of course, policy-makers may value existing welfare state arrange-
ments highly (either because they are in line with their policy preferences, or
because they are electorally rewarding, or both), but nevertheless be under
pressure to reform them because the status quo is ineffective (for example,
it places an excessive burden on public budgets). Alternatively, ineffective
policies can be perpetuated if they enjoy high popularity or are in line with
the preferences of policy-makers. Nevertheless, it can be expected that, all
else equal, the probability of policy change grows with the ineffectiveness of
the status quo. Our first hypothesis is therefore:
H1: the probability of policy change increases as the effectiveness
of the existing policy decreases.
Of course, not only the characteristics of the status quo are important,
but so also are those of the alternative policy. In particular, policy-makers try
to assess the consequences of a change for both policy and political outcomes.
If the new policy is introduced, will there be positive effects on, for example,
public budgets? And what will be the electoral consequences? One way for
policy-makers to answer such questions is to look at the experience of others.
If other countries have already introduced the new policy, their experience
could help policy-makers assess the consequences of policy change in their
own country. In other words, policy-makers can learn from others. We
define learning as a process whereby policy-makers use the experience of
others to update their beliefs on the consequences of policies (Meseguer 2004;
Meseguer 2005; Meseguer 2006b; Meseguer 2006a). Learning is thus one of
the forms that international interdependence can take, and is therefore one
possible diffusion mechanism. Of course, learning is not the only diffusion
mechanism: competition, cooperation, emulation, and norms can also be
relevant (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Braun and Gilardi 2006). For
instance, countries can be influenced by other countries with which they are
in competition for capital (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006), or by the
symbolic properties of policies rather than their effects (Polillo and Guille´n
2005). In this article, however, we concentrate on learning.
A growing literature has demonstrated that policies diffuse internation-
ally. Countries have mutually influenced each other in a wide range of do-
mains, such as foreign economic policy (Simmons and Elkins 2004), market-
oriented reforms (Meseguer 2004; Meseguer 2006a; Henisz, Zelner, and Guille´n
2005), public-sector downsizing (Lee and Strang 2006), tax policy (Swank
2006), pension reform (Brooks 2005; Brooks 2007), independent regulatory
agencies (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005; Gilardi 2005), central banks (Polillo
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and Guille´n 2005), and bilateral investment treaties (Elkins, Guzman, and
Simmons 2006). On the other hand, the empirical evidence on learning is
mixed. The foreign economic policies of successful countries (in terms of eco-
nomic growth) tend to be more imitated than those of less successful examples
(Simmons and Elkins 2004), and bilateral investment treaties are more likely
to be signed if the experience of others shows that they help attract foreign
investment (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006), but these effects are only
moderately strong. Similarly, privatization and market-oriented reforms tend
to more likely if the experience of others shows that they have positive ef-
fects on economic growth, but this finding is somewhat ambiguous (Meseguer
2004; Meseguer 2006a). These inconsistencies might be due to the fact that
learning processes are more complex than it is usually assumed. Lee and
Strang (2006), for instance, show that learning is strongly “theory-driven”:
it influences policy change only if it is in line with prior beliefs3. Thus, in-
ternational evidence that public-sector downsizing leads to strong economic
performance has an impact on similar reforms at home because it is consis-
tent with dominant views on the appropriate size of government; by contrast,
evidence that it leads to weak performance is neglected. Analogously, evi-
dence that upsizing leads to weak performance results in downsizing, but
evidence that it leads to strong performance is not taken into account.
In this article we consider another form of complexity, namely, hetero-
geneity over time. The sociological diffusion literature (for an overview, see
Strang and Soule 1998) argues that some practices progressively become so-
cially valued, and through their adoption policy-makers can show that their
actions are legitimate and thus protect themselves from criticism (Meyer
and Rowan 1977). In extreme cases, a practice can even become taken for
granted as the only appropriate solution to a given problem (Hannan and
Carroll 1992). Independent central banks are a case in point: their spread
has been due to their symbolic properties more than to their consequences
for macroeconomic outcomes (McNamara 2002; Polillo and Guille´n 2005).
Therefore, sociologists argue that diffusion processes might be rational dur-
ing their early stages, but social mechanisms become more and more relevant
as the process unfolds, since symbolic aspects become more important.
On the basis of these considerations, we develop two hypotheses on learn-
ing:
3As Lee and Strang (2006, 904) summarize: “[i]n short, when theories and evidence
come into conflict, theories win.”
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H2: the probability of policy change increases with the effectiveness
of the alternative policy, which policy-makers estimate by looking
at its consequences in other countries.
H3: the effects of learning decline over time.
Finally, we develop quite simple arguments on the role of political fac-
tors. We do not expect partisan politics to play an important role in the
adoption of patient-classification systems because the reform is very techni-
cal and has been perceived as such in most countries. By contrast, we expect
the institutional context to matter. As is well known, certain institutional
arrangements make policy change more difficult than others: the greater the
number of actors whose agreement is necessary for a law to be passed, the
higher the probability is that the status quo will prevail (Tsebelis 2002).
While the reforms we consider are technical, they have been enacted through
legislative change4 and veto players can be expected to matter, although
probably less than for more politicized decision. On the other hand, we ex-
pect institutions to be more constraining for innovators than for followers.
As more examples become available and, possibly, the experience of others
shows that the new policy is a good one, policy-makers may find it easier
to push the reform through the various veto points. By contrast, innovators
cannot rely on this sort of ammunition and might therefore be more con-
strained by a high number of veto players. Our hypothesis is therefore the
following:
H4: veto players make policy change more difficult, but more so for
innovators than for followers.
We now turn to the discussion of data and methods, and we will then
move to the statistical analysis.
4 Data and methods
The dependent variable of the analysis is change in hospital financing through
the introduction of some form of patient-classification systems (see Section
2). We focus on reforms involving the imposition of patient-classification sys-
tems to all hospitals by national authorities (possibly with extensive transi-
tion periods). We have taken into account binding decisions enacted through
4The operationalization of the dependent variable will be discussed in Section 4.
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legislation, both for the original introduction of the reform and for successive
changes aimed at revising or extending it. On the other hand, we have ex-
cluded cases where central authorities took administrative steps towards the
introduction of patient-classification systems, but left considerable freedom
to sub-national units in the implementation of the decision. We have also
excluded decisions with only local scope, as well as pilot projects carried out
in just a few hospitals. Therefore, the dependent variable takes the value of
1 if patient-classification systems are introduced in a given country or are re-
formed through legislation, and 0 otherwise. Given that several decisions are
possible, we keep observations after the first introduction. We have collected
empirical information on the timing of these reforms in 19 OECD countries
between 1980 and 2005 through case studies.
The coding of the dependent variable can be illustrated with the example
of Belgium. After a number of pilot studies, patient-classification systems
were introduced through national legislation in 1995 and progressively imple-
mented throughout the country. In 2002 another hospital financing reform
was passed which introduced new methods to assign patients to the various
categories in the classification schemes. This decision deepened the imple-
mentation of the original reform, since it improved the adaptation of the
schemes to the specificities of the Belgian health care system. For the case
of Belgium, we have coded the dependent variable 1 in 1995, marking the in-
troduction of patient-classification system in Belgian hospitals, and in 2002,
when the system was reformed. For the other years, the dependent variable
takes the value of 0.
Given this operationalization of the dependent variable, we model the
process primarily through a logit, which is an appropriate choice for event-
history data provided that the issue of time dependence is dealt with (Beck,
Katz, and Tucker 1998). To control for time dependence, we have first run
a logistic regression with time dummies only, and computed predicted prob-
abilities for decisions to introduce or reform patient-classification systems.
This gives the discrete baseline hazard, which we have then smoothed us-
ing a locally weighted smoothing function (lowess) with a 40% bandwidth5
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 76–77; Beck and Jackman 1998, 614–
617). In the analysis we use principally the smoothed baseline hazard, but
we also employ the discrete hazard (which fully takes out time dependence)
as a control.
In addition, we also include a variable counting the number of reforms
that have been introduced in a country, which obviously takes the value of
5The bandwidth refers to the share of data used to construct the smoothed function.
The higher the share, the more smoothed the function becomes.
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0 before the first introduction. This is needed to control, at least in part,
for previous decisions in the context of multiple or repeated events (Beck,
Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1272). However, the assumption here is that the first
and any subsequent decisions have the same nature, which is not necessarily
realistic. Therefore, we have pursued also two additional modeling strategies
as robustness checks. Firstly, we have modeled successive introductions as
multiple events through an ordered logit, which does not assume that the
second reform has the same nature as the first, and explicitly treats them
as different events. Although within the logit framework multiple events are
usually modeled through a multinomial logit (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004, 173–175), the ordered logit is a better alternative in our case because
successive reforms have a logical hierarchy. Not only are there “first”, “sec-
ond”, and in a couple of cases even “third” reforms, but subsequent reforms
have built on and expanded original reforms. There is thus a clear order
among them. Unlike the multinomial logit, the ordered logit takes this into
account.
Secondly, we have modeled successive introductions as repeated events,
that is, events of the same type that can occur more than once. This is
best done through a conditional Cox model, whose advantage is to model
explicitly the sequence of the events (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 158–
162; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002). Concretely, the model allows baseline
hazards to vary across events. On the other hand, a single set of coefficients
is estimated. In our case, all decisions can be conceptualized as events of
the same type (legislative decisions), but on the other hand their sequence
matters. In particular, a second reform cannot be introduced unless a first
has already been enacted, and the view that all reforms need not have the
same baseline hazard is realistic. The conditional Cox model is therefore well
suited to our data.
We will see in the next section that our results are robust to these alter-
natives. Given that using more complex modeling strategies does not alter
the findings, we will focus on logit models, and we will comment only briefly
on the other options. Full results are available upon request.
Turning now to the independent variables, we measure the effectiveness
of the existing policy (H1) through the recent trend in public expenditures
on health. Cost containment has been one of the major objectives of all gov-
ernments, and hospital expenditures constitute a significant share of public
expenditures on health: in 2000, the OECD average was more than 35%
(OECD 2006). Therefore, increased efficiency in the hospital sector, which
is one of the major aims of patient-classification systems, can be expected
to help control the rise of public expenditures on health; conversely, patient-
classification systems can be seen as one of the solutions to control expen-
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ditures. Our hypothesis is that the probability that patient-classification
systems are introduced rises when the effectiveness of the existing policy is
poor (H1). We operationalize this idea by looking at the recent trend in pub-
lic expenditures on health (as a share of GDP) for each country: the more
they rise, the lower is the effectiveness of the existing system. Conversely, the
less they rise, and the more they decline, the more effective the existing sys-
tem is, and pressures for change will be less important. Concretely, we have
run rolling regressions of public expenditures on health (as a share of GDP)
on time with a moving window of five years, and have taken the regression
coefficients as measures of recent trends. The coefficients indicate how, on
average, total expenditures evolved during the five-year period preceding the
observation.
We also include measures for the effectiveness of patient-classification
systems, that is, the alternative policy (H2). One way for policy-makers to
determine whether patient-classification systems lead to better performance
is to look at the experience of others: if countries that have introduced
patient-classification systems are more able to control the rise of public ex-
penditures on health, policy-makers could conclude that the reform will lead
to the desired effects (H2). To operationalize this idea, we look at the cor-
relations between patient-classification systems and public expenditures on
health. Following Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006), we regress, for ev-
ery country and every year, the trend in public expenditures on health in
other countries (during the previous five years) on a measure of the extent to
which hospitals in those countries are financed through patient-classification
systems. We measure this by applying a logistic transformation to the num-
ber of years since the introduction of patient-classification systems6. In most
countries patient-classification systems were introduced progressively, and we
assume that their effects will grow over time, but not in a linear way. The lo-
gistic transformation implies that the implementation of patient-classification
systems starts slowly, reaches 50% after five years, and is almost complete
after ten years, which is a quite realistic assumption.
We then use the coefficients of these regressions as measures of the con-
clusion to which policy-makers would come if they looked in a simple but
comprehensive way at all available experiences at the national level7. If the
coefficients of regressions of public expenditures trends on experience with
6The first year is coded −4, the second −3, and so on. The “experience” variable is
then computed as e
x
1+ex .
7Note that the coefficients are country-specific: Germany, for instance, is not included
in the regressions that measure the link between the patient-classification systems and
public-expenditure trends in “other” countries from Germany’s point of view. Obviously,
Germany is included in the regressions from the perspective of all other countries.
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patient-classification systems are positive, it means that patient-classification
systems lead to an upward trend in total expenditures on health, while if
the coefficients are negative patient-classification systems are associated with
downward trends in this variable. Rational learners, however, take into ac-
count not only the average effect of policies on relevant outcomes, but also
the uncertainty surrounding this effect (Meseguer 2006b). In statistical par-
lance, the width of the confidence interval around the coefficient should make
a difference for rational learners: the narrower it is, the more informative the
experience of others is. To capture this idea, we weigh the coefficients by
the absolute value of the corresponding t-values. Since higher t-values mean
that estimates are more precise, this procedure gives more weight to the ex-
perience of others when it is more consistent, and less weight when evidence
is inconclusive.
If the learning hypothesis is correct, that is, if policy-makers update their
beliefs on the effectiveness of the new policy by looking at the experience of
others, then the probability that patient-classification systems are adopted
should be higher when the experience of others points at a negative link
between the reform and total expenditures on health. Therefore, the expected
sign of the learning coefficient is negative.
As robustness checks, we have also employed the unweighted coefficients
of the rolling regressions (which do not take uncertainty into account), and we
have computed both the weighted and unweighted measures with three-year
and seven-year trends.
Veto players (H4) are measured through the “political constraints” vari-
able (polcon3) constructed by Henisz (2000, Henisz (2002). In addition, we
include a series of controls. Given the technical nature of the reform we do
not expect partisanship to play an important role, but we include two dum-
mies to control for it. The first takes the value of 1 if left parties control more
than two thirds of government seats, while the second takes the value of 1
if right parties control more than two thirds of government seats; the base-
line category is thus centrist governments. Data are taken from Armingeon,
Leimgruber, Beyeler, and Menegale (2005). We also control for the level of
total expenditures on health (as a share of GDP) and of public expenditures
on health (as a share of total expenditures), with data taken from the OECD
(2006).
5 Statistical analysis
The statistical analysis is reported in Table 1. Model 1 tests hypotheses 1
and 2. We see that the introduction of patient-classification systems is more
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likely when the effectiveness of the current policy is weak. The more public
expenditures on health rise, the higher is the probability of policy change.
This is consistent with H1. By contrast, H2 does not seem to find support:
the probability of change does not depend on the effectiveness of the alter-
native policy, estimated by looking at the experience of other countries. On
the other hand, Model 2 tests H3, which states that learning effects decline
over time, and finds that the interaction of learning and time is indeed signif-
icant. However, the positive sign of the learning coefficient and the negative
sign of the interaction term mean that learning actually gains importance as
the diffusion process unfolds. This result is unexpected but not unexplain-
able, as we will see in a while. Model 3 simply checks the robustness of the
findings to the inclusion of the discrete baseline hazard, which fully controls
time dependence. Model 4 tests H4, namely, that veto players constrain pol-
icy change, especially for early adopters. This hypothesis seems confirmed:
political constraints have a negative impact on the introduction of patient-
classification systems, but the effect declines over time, which means that
the institutional context matters more for early adopters than for latecom-
ers. Finally, Model 5 includes the discrete baseline hazard as a strong control
for time dependence.
A series of additional analyses, not reported here due to space constraints
but available upon request, show that these results are robust to alternative
operationalizations and specifications. Firstly, we have employed the un-
weighted coefficients of the rolling regressions (which do not take uncertainty
into account) in the operationalization of learning. Results are almost identi-
cal. Secondly, we have computed the learning and public expenditures trend
variables using three- and seven-years moving windows (the main analysis
relies on five-years periods). While findings on learning and the effectiveness
of the existing policy are generally stable (although more so when using the
seven-years period), the effect of political constraints seems to be more de-
pendent on the operationalization of the other variables. We will take this
into account in the interpretation. Thirdly, in order to better account for the
repeated nature of the events we study, we have rerun the analyses using an
ordered logit (which, as explained in Section 4, models multiple events) and
a conditional Cox (which models repeated events). Results remain essentially
unchanged, although in some models the political constraints variable (and
sometimes also its interaction with time) is significant only at the 10% level.
Finally, many of the innovators were Anglo-Saxon countries, and one could
wonder whether our measure of political constraints does not actually cap-
ture the cultural similarities between those countries, and possibly the fact
that ideas travel more easily among them. To check this, we have included
a dummy variable taking the value of one for Anglo-Saxon countries as well
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Table 1: Logit analysis of the adoption of hospital financing reforms.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Learning 0.083 3.571*** 2.945*** 3.582*** 2.919***
(0.78) (3.86) (2.95) (3.74) (2.67)
Learning × Time -0.581*** -0.472*** -0.578*** -0.465***
(3.93) (3.03) (3.79) (2.77)
PEHa trend 4.087** 5.752*** 5.548** 6.624*** 6.293***
(2.53) (2.88) (2.50) (3.32) (2.84)
Political constraints -0.213 0.259 -0.612 -24.793** -31.017**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.25) (2.03) (2.12)
Polit. constr. × Time 1.276** 1.567**
(2.02) (2.06)
Left government -0.088 -0.266 -0.154 -0.270 -0.162
(0.16) (0.44) (0.25) (0.41) (0.23)
Right government -0.988 -1.292* -1.073 -1.601** -1.459*
(1.53) (1.77) (1.36) (2.27) (1.80)
TEHb (%GDP) 0.049 -0.032 -0.011 -0.011 0.021
(0.16) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
PEHa (%TEHb) 0.005 -0.008 -0.000 -0.003 0.004
(0.12) (0.17) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09)
Baseline hazardc 57.123 19.060 31.385
(1.62) (0.62) (0.88)
Baseline hazardd 34.301*** 37.550***
(3.94) (3.94)
Time 0.069 0.044 -0.531* -0.672*
(1.16) (0.69) (1.65) (1.85)
Previous decisions -0.156 -0.307 -0.328 -0.418* -0.440
(0.68) (1.20) (1.10) (1.71) (1.48)
Constant -5.478 -4.184 -5.201 6.626 7.923
(0.88) (0.65) (0.76) (0.74) (0.79)
Wald χ2 35.45 120.95 96.81 326.66 158.58
Countries 19 19 19 19 19
Observations 369 369 369 369 369
Robust z statistics in parentheses (for clustering on countries).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a Public expenditures on health. b Total expenditures on health.
c Smoothed. d Discrete.
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of policy change as a function of the effec-
tiveness of the current policy.
as an interaction with time, in order to mirror our modelization of the role
of political constraints. The Anglo-Saxon dummy is never significant, nor is
its interaction with time. The other coefficients do not change.
These robustness checks allow us to be reasonably confident that our
results do not hinge upon particular methodological choices. To interpret
them properly, we need to look beyond coefficients. Figures 2-5 display more
interesting and informative quantities. Figures 2 and 4 have been computed
using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000), while Figures 3 and 5 show
interaction effects and have been constructed following Brambor, Clark, and
Golder (2006). All figures are based on Model 4.
Figure 2 illustrates how the probability of policy change varies as the
effectiveness of the existing system declines (H1). The more positive the
recent trend in public expenditures on health, the higher the likelihood is
that patient-classification systems are introduced. This confirms that our
first hypothesis is consistent with our data: policy-makers are more likely to
change when the existing policy does not perform well.
Figure 3 shows how learning effects vary over time (H3). The horizontal
axis represents years, while the vertical axis represents the marginal effect
of learning, that is, how the predicted probability of policy change varies
when the experience of other countries shows that patient-classification sys-
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of learning on the probability of policy change.
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Figure 5: Marginal effect of political constraints on the probability of policy
change.
tems lead to a slight decline in public expenditures on health (that is, the
desired outcome) instead of a slight increase8. It can be seen that the impact
of learning grows over time. Two points are noteworthy. First, our hy-
pothesis on learning (H2) is confirmed: the adoption of patient-classification
systems is more likely when the experience of other countries shows that this
policy is linked to a reduction in public expenditures on health. It should
be emphasized that here learning takes the uncertainty of the estimate of
the relationship between policies and outcomes into account: it is therefore a
strongly rational version. Second, while we hypothesized that learning effects
may vary longitudinally (H3), our main expectation, based on sociological
theory, was that they would decline over time. Figure 3 shows that the im-
pact of learning does vary over time, but in fact it grows. This means that
policy-makers are more sensitive to information supplied by the experience
of others when a new policy is already somewhat widespread than when it is
a fresh innovation. After all, it makes sense: policy-makers need not be in-
stantly aware of policy innovations elsewhere, and it takes some time before a
new policy comes on their radar screen. In addition, the experience of early
8More precisely, the vertical axis shows the predicted-probability change that occurs
when, all else equal, the learning variable goes from 0.05 to −0.05, 0 being the situation
where patient-classification systems have no effects on total expenditures.
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adopters is inherently not very trustworthy: estimates of the relationship
between policies and outcomes depend crucially on one or two cases, which
could be outliers in some ways. Therefore, in a rational learning perspec-
tive it makes sense for policy-makers to wait until more evidence is available
before making a decision. This interpretation is consistent with Figure 3.
The same result is shown also in Figure 4, which may be more intuitive
since it represents how the predicted probability of policy change varies as a
function of the experience of others, and this in two different years, one early
and the other late in the process. In 1985, the experience of others did not
matter. The probability of policy change is constant, and does not depend on
whether public-expenditures trends are more favorable in countries that have
adopted patient-classification systems. By contrast, in 2000 the experience of
others matters a lot: the probability of policy change is about 20 times bigger
if learning (which takes into account the uncertainty of the estimates) indi-
cates that patient classification systems lead to a marked decrease in public
expenditures on health than if it indicates that the reform is associated with
a marked increase of expenditures. Therefore, we can conclude that patient-
classification systems have spread in part following a learning process that
seems to be more rational than the sociological literature expects: learning
takes uncertainty into account and becomes more important as the diffusion
process unfolds.
Finally, Figure 5 displays how the marginal effect of political constraints
on the probability that patient-classification systems are introduced changes
over time. Our hypothesis was that the more political constraints there are,
the less likely policy change, but especially for innovators (H4). Figure 5
indicates that political constraints have a negative effect that declines over
time. More precisely, it shows that the impact of political constraints on pol-
icy change is negative until about 1994, but is not significantly different from
0 afterwards. Early adopters are countries with fewer political constraints,
but later in the process countries with more political constraints are also able
to change policy. Political constraints, therefore, do not seem to block policy
change altogether, but only to slow it. This consistent with the nature of the
reforms under study, namely legislative changes, where thus formal institu-
tions matter, but on policies that are not highly politicized, which therefore
are not impossible to pass in institutional contexts with many veto players.
Overall, the story told by Figure 5 is consistent with our expectations: polit-
ical constraints have a negative effect on policy change, but especially at the
beginning of the process. Innovators tend to be countries that face relatively
few political constraints. It should be stressed, however, that our findings on
the role of political constraints are not entirely robust, as discussed earlier.
They should therefore be treated with additional caution.
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6 Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that welfare states are interdependent and,
therefore, social policies diffuse cross-nationally. The results of our study of
hospital financing reforms indicate that, although domestic factors matter,
diffusion is also important in explaining the spread of patient-classification
systems. More precisely, the decision to introduce these instruments is in-
fluenced by their performance abroad: their adoption is more likely when
the experience of other countries shows that they lead to a milder rise, or
a decrease, in public expenditures on health, and when the empirical evi-
dence supporting this conclusion is more reliable. Therefore, a learning pro-
cess seems to have characterized the spread of hospital financing reforms in
OECD countries. Moreover, learning has acquired importance over time, sug-
gesting that, as patient-classification systems have become more widespread,
policy-makers have looked more closely at the consequences of this reform
abroad. Overall, these findings constitute a strong confirmation of our main
hypotheses.
Diffusion and learning matter, but this does not mean that country-
specific factors are no longer relevant. Although the technical nature of
patient classification systems means that partisan differences do not matter
much, other domestic factors do. Reform is more likely when the existing sys-
tem is not very effective: as public expenditures on health increase, so does
the probability of policy change. Political institutions are also important.
Institutional arrangements creating obstacles to policy change slow reforms
down, but do not prevent them. We have found countries to be more likely
to be innovators if their institutional environment is relatively veto-free, but
polities characterized by more political constraints eventually catch up: they
simply need more time.
These findings have implications for both the welfare state and diffusion
literatures. For the former, the bottom line is that welfare states cannot be
considered as separate entities. They are interdependent, and welfare state
development and reform should be studied as such. This article has focused
on learning, and we have taken policy outcomes (the trend in public expen-
ditures on health) as the relevant consequence about which policy-makers
learn. But of course, policy-makers are also interested in the political effects
of policies. What are the chances that a reform can successfully be voted
into law? And if this happens, will there be electoral rewards or backlash?
Future work should certainly take these points into account, in particular
when studying reforms that are more politicized than patient-classification
systems. Labor market policies and pensions can be cases in point: in these
domains the political consequences of reforms are highly relevant to policy-
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makers.
For the diffusion literature, another implication of our analysis is that
diffusion processes need not be unconditional. Most studies of learning have
implicitly assumed that learning matters equally for all countries and time
periods, and their results have been mixed (for example, Meseguer 2006a;
Meseguer 2004; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006). By contrast, our
findings suggest that learning effects can vary over time. Additionally, the
experience of others could also play different roles according to the policy
preferences or ideological orientation of policy-makers, especially when the
reform has strong political connotations. Taking the heterogeneity of dif-
fusion processes more seriously into account is therefore another relevant
point for future research, especially for more fundamental welfare reforms,
which are usually very controversial. Pensions and labor market policies,
for instance, are areas where policy preferences and partisan politics can be
expected to play a more important role, both independently and as filters of
learning. Policies that work well abroad will not be easily adopted at home
if they contrast with the preferences of policy-makers and/or if they are un-
popular. Partisan politics, and domestic factors in general, are likely to be
much more relevant in theses contexts.
In addition, it would be interesting to examine the normative conse-
quences of diffusion processes in the welfare state domain. Welfare policies
diffuse, but is this a good or a bad thing? For instance, Volden and Cohen
(2006) have shown that successful welfare reforms have spread across US
states, but especially those that are successful in moving whites, rather than
blacks, off welfare, an outcome that many would see as unjust. What are the
consequences of the international diffusion of (welfare) policies? Very little
is known on this important issue.
We would also like to stress the importance of taking decisions rather
than aggregate figures such as spending as the dependent variable for dif-
fusion analyses. Recently, Hacker (2004b) has forcefully stressed that non-
decisions (like the lack of adaptation to a new socio-economic context) matter
at least as much as decisions in the development of welfare states, but the
literature has actually never been very focused on decisions. Rather, it has
relied heavily on aggregate figures of spending, which constitute the depen-
dent variable of an overwhelming majority of quantitative studies. Recent
efforts have tracked the evolution of welfare state arrangements through bet-
ter measures, but the dependent variable remains an aggregate figure, such
as social citizenship rights (Korpi and Palme 2003) or income replacement
rates (Allan and Scruggs 2004). While these dependent variables make per-
fect sense if we are interested in retrenchment and its determinants, they are
less useful in a diffusion context. Expenditures and replacement rates are cer-
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tainly influenced by decisions, but also by a host of other factors; conversely,
decisions may be important despite their lack of effects on expenditures, or
need not translate immediately into observable effects on expenditures or
replacement rates. Therefore, diffusion studies of the welfare state should
focus on decisions as the dependent variable more than on expenditures or
other aggregate figures.
In conclusion, diffusion matters for the development of the welfare state,
and studying national reforms as if they were independent of each other (the
implicit assumption of the overwhelming majority of studies) is becoming
increasingly implausible.
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